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A More Humane Human Nature
In desperation, or perhaps irritation, one might respond
by suggesting that Glaucon, Machiavelli, and Hobbes
have all simply misunderstood human nature. For, one might
insist, Gyges is not a good example of human nature, since
he manifests nothing of our natural concern for others. David
Hume,
an Enlightenment philosopher of much more optimistic and genial
temperament than Machiavelli
and Hobbes, suggests this. He recognises that human beings
naturally care for their loved ones and sympathise with others’
feelings, including those of complete strangers. In his A
Treatise of Human Nature, he writes that sympathy makes
human beings ‘mirrors’ of each other, and that this give them
‘a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together,
without any advantages they can ever propose to reap from
their union’. Love and sympathy of this kind would ensure
that there would be more trust, and therefore more cooperation
and peace, in a state of nature, or between princes, than
Hobbes and Machiavelli claim. For example, I may be able to
trust the members of my family not to attack me in a state
of nature, simply because I know that they love me.
But unfortunately, even among human beings who love and
sympathise with others, there is still much scope for distrust
and war. Firstly, there is the sad fact that human beings’
care for their loved ones makes them badly disposed to enemies
of their loved ones. Think of the Fowlers and the Mitchells
in Eastenders, or the Capulets and the Montegues in Romeo
and Juliet. Hume
rightly accepts this. He also recognises that, although sympathy
for others can make us more impartial, neither this nor love
necessarily overcomes our more egoistic interests. If Hume
had seen Eastenders, he would not have been surprised to see
Phil Mitchell having an affair with his brother’s wife, despite
the bond between the brothers. In a state of nature, such
trumping of love or sympathy by self-interest might be particularly
crucial: for example, you might sympathise with my hunger,
or even love me, but not enough to give me your food. Finally,
note that even a saintly human being, whose sympathy for others
provides him with his most important interests, must compete
with the less saintly (and, perhaps, other saints with different
sympathies) for the things he cares about. This is what makes
Superman films (barely) watchable.
However, one might still try to resist the Machiavellian
conclusion. One might, for example, put one’s faith in education
and civilization to improve and spread our sympathy for others,
and thus reduce the likelihood of distrust and war. This is
Hume’s
hope, and that of many other Enlightenment figures. Many of
them, like John Locke, Immanuel
Kant and Karl
Marx, even go so far as to presuppose a shared sense of
morality, which might be cultivated to overcome the partiality
of our self-interest, love, and sympathy. (Socrates responds
to Glaucon’s argument by making a similar claim.) But if we
had sufficient sympathy for others, or really shared a sufficiently
strong sense of morality, we would not seem to need to trust
each other at all. Even assuming that such improvements are
possible, then, putting our faith in them does not give us
much guidance for living and trusting in our present, vulnerable
condition, in which we must live until such improvements are
made.
Alternatively, of course, we might follow Glaucon, Hobbes,
and numerous Home Secretaries in turning to detection and
punishment to dissuade us from harming and stealing from each
other. The possibility of being found out by the police and
punished with a prison sentence, for instance, might dissuade
some potential wrongdoers from crime. Those particularly afraid
of their fellows might even think that a very coercive state
is a price worth paying for security. But detection and punishment
can be effective only if the vast majority of human beings
do not even think of harming or stealing from each other,
and if we already have a certain trust in the agencies of
detection and punishment themselves. To emphasise detection
and punishment therefore seems, at best, to be a very limited
solution, and, at worst, to miss the point entirely.
Our last hope of avoiding the Machiavellian conclusion,
then, would seem to lie in human irrationality. Like those
philosophers who have given up their faith in rationality,
we could simply hope that human irrationality will somehow
keep our most essential cooperative activities afloat. But
this is a largely blind and decidedly risky strategy, and,
indeed, seems paradoxical: how can we rationally persuade
ourselves to be irrational? This strategy should therefore
be attempted only if all else fails.
As at the end of every bad film ...
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