People's War
The strategic implications of France’s surrender were grim. Correlli Barnet…
CORRELLI The global scene was that we were already at war with Germany and Italy, and that meant the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean across our Mediterranean lines of communications to the Middle East and India and everywhere, and on the other hand the Japanese, they had a fleet of whatever it was something like eleven heavy ships and five or six aircraft carriers, and therefore the, the fear in Britain had been ever since the early nineteen thirties that when we found ourselves in a pickle in Europe that would be the moment the Japanese might choose to attack the British Empire in the Far East. So the overall naval picture after the French Navy was taken out of the equation was really pretty worrying.
MICHAEL If the French fleet joined Hitler the Royal Navy would be stretched and threatened across the oceans of the world, and be less able to defend Britain from invasion.
The potentially disastrous shift in the balance of naval forces was leading towards a Battle for Britain that we’ve forgotten to remember, perhaps because the memory is so distressing.
There’s no museum dedicated to it, there will be no South Bank memorial.
Today very few of us have even heard the name. But the Battle of Mers El Kabir was crucial to saving Britain.
The nightmare scenario that the French ships would be available to Hitler preoccupied Churchill and the war cabinet as June turned into July, 1940.
Correlli Barnett – former Keeper of the Churchill Archive – showed me the cabinet papers for those critical days.
MICHAEL Looking at the Cabinet papers here of Churchill saying that the French Prime Minister cannot be relied upon in any assurances he gives about the fleet and then saying finally that we must ensure that these ships either come under our control or are put out of the way for good.
CORRELLI That’s absolutely right. We felt in the desperate situation we were in we simply could not rely on the terms of the armistice in which the Germans and Italians had assured the French that these, these ships would never be used again in war on their side, how could you really rely on them, it all looks far too dicey, something had got to be done. So actually you’re quite clear about that, and so indeed was Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, the first sea lord, and the first memo that I’ve seen on this whole topic was on the seventh of June, well before the War Cabinet was taking decisions, in which Dudley Pound was saying well really the only solution to this problem is to sink the French fleet.
MICHAEL So when does the War Cabinet begin to consider the possibility at least of an ultimatum if not actually sinking the French fleet as a possibility?
CORRELLI Around the twentieth of June onwards Churchill as Prime Minister said that we really had to sink these heavy ships, the so called force de raid, which was you know really one of the most formidable naval forces around at the time, and obviously if that went over to the, the German side under the terms of the armistice then it would be extremely alarming.
MICHAEL So when the British Government engages the French Government on these points it’s not a bluff. Churchill knows that this may end up with the British Royal Navy sinking the French Navy.
CORRELLI Oh absolutely, I mean obviously he said in his speech to Parliament afterwards, I mean it was an anguished decision to have to take, but just the same you know Churchill and particularly Pound were absolutely resolute, and in the key meetings in late June there was no dissent at the Cabinet level whatsoever.
MICHAEL Back in May 1940, at the time of Dunkirk, Churchill had persuaded his war cabinet to fight on against Hitler, desperate though Britain’s position seemed. Now as he approached the threat from France, Britain’s ally of only a few weeks before, he was single-minded in his appreciation of the strategic realities, his thoughts unclouded by sentimentality. In these qualities lies his greatness. Britain must sink the French fleet.
It was gathered mainly in two ports: at Alexandria at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and, in the west, at the Algerian coastal town of Oran, in its naval base of Mers El Kabir.
Admirals James Somerville, commander of the Royal Navy’s Force H at Gibraltar, and Andrew Cunningham at Alexandria delivered an ultimatum to the French Admirals on July the 3rd.
It offered stark choices: join the British war effort, sail to Britain, sail to the French West Indies, demilitarise in place, or be attacked.
Chief Petty Officer Alfred Fishlock was in the “B” gun turret of HMS Orion on the 3rd of July, moored in Alexandria next to the French ships that he might soon be asked to destroy.
FISHLOCK An ultimatum had been delivered to the Admiral of the Fleet in Alexandria, in the French fleet in Alexandria, telling them that they had a choice either to come over to us, or else they weren’t going anywhere. And I remember the person in charge of B turret at that stage was Chief Petty Officer Carpenter, and of course once we got the order to go to action stations we all assembled in B turret, he told number two, who was the person who opens and, and closes the breech, to open the breech. He looked along the barrel when the gun was practically horizontal and he said oh that’ll be all right, that’ll bloody hit ‘em. Doesn’t bear, imagine what would happen had eventually we’d opened fire or they’d have opened fire on us. Alexandria would have just disappeared off the map.
MICHAEL Alfred Fishlock’s commander, Admiral Cunningham, was negotiating with French Admiral Godfroy in Alexandria. Perhaps it was the proximity of the British ships that persuaded Godfroy to disarm; perhaps it was his British wife. But for Admiral Somerville’s force H in the western Mediterranean there would be no such compromise. Captain Val Bailey was part of the Force H and remembers setting sail for Mers El Kabir.
BAILEY We sailed from Gib, call all ships, I don’t remember what time so when it was dark, and went down into the Atlantic. On arrival in the area we were detached. Active was detached to go and do an anti submarine, run up and down outside the breakwater at Oran, which was quite exciting because by then it was fairly obvious we were, we’d been told that any submarines coming out were to be sunk. So we’re going up and down a few hundred yards off the breakwater and you could see through the other side of the breakwater some dirty great big masts which were battleships. Nobody told us anything but we saw at intervals a boat going into the harbour and then coming out again after some time and then back in again.
< previous next > Page 3 of 4
